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In the SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE FA VAT ELLA, by and through 
her Guardian Ad Litem, FELIX E . 
.B'AVATELLA 
' Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs. -
.J.bJAN W. POULSEN and 
MARY ELLEN CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10264 
srrATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued defendants for injuries resulting from 
a collision between the automobiles driven by the two 
defendants which collision occurred at an intersection. 
Plaintiff was a passenger in the automobile being driven 
by Mary Ellen Carter. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson denied the Appellants 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at the time of pre-trial 
and from said order this appeal is prosecuted. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the order of the Pre-trial 
Court reversed and a dismissal of plaintiff's action 
against the appellant, Mary Ellen Carter, ordered. 
STATEMENT OF FkCT'S 
Plaintiff, a 7 year old minor child, was a passenger 
in an automobile being driven by appellant, Mary Ellen 
Carter, who was a teacher at St. Ann's School. The child 
was a student at St. Ann's School. (See appellant's pe-
tition for interlocutory appeal.) The arrangement for 
transportation of the minor child was made by her par-
ents. No payment by the parents or the minor child to 
the appellant was made for the ride. 
No social relationship existed between the minor 
child and the appellant and the ride arises out of the 
fact that the relationship of teacher and pupil exists. 
The collision occurred on the 7th of December, 1963, 
at the intersection of Wilmington Avenue and 5th East 
Street in Salt Lake City and plaintiff claims that the 
collision occurred as the result of the negligence of the 
drivers of both automobiles. 
As a result of the collision the plaintiff suffered 
serious and permanent injuries. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II 
A MINOR CHILD OF THE AGE OF 7 YEARS CANNOT 
BE HELD TO BE A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It is the position that a teacher hauling a student to 
her school is not doing so for the pleasure of the stu-
dent's company especially when the student is a 7 year 
old child. 
In the absence of a statutory enactment, the general 
rule in the United States is that a person operating or 
responsible for the operation of an automobile must use 
ordinary care for the safety of guests therein and is 
liable for any injuries proximately caused by negligence 
in the operation of the vehicle. Godfrey v. Brown, 220 
Cal. 57, 29 P.2d. 165; Shapiro v. Bookspan, 155 Cal. App. 
2d 353, 318 P.2d 123. 
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A guests is defined as a person who rides in the 
automobile of another without conferring benefit on him 
other than the pleasure of his company. Hart v. Hogan, 
173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99; Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal. 
2d 359, 317 P.2d 601; Cook v. Fariah, 73 Nev. 295, 318 
P.2d 649; Parrish v. Ash, 32 Wash. 2d 637, 203 P.2d 330. 
This Court in the case of Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 
2d 16, 376 P.2d 541 where both a social relationship 
and a small monetary consideration was disclosed held 
that a Jury question was created. It was for the Jury to 
determine whether or not the person being transported 
was a passenger or guest. The Court stated in its de-
cision as follows : 
"Where both payment and social incentive are 
present and the evidence would support a finding 
that each exerted a substantial influence on haul-
ing the passenger the problem as to the relation-
ship between the parties must be faced up to and 
resolved by submitting the issues to the Jury." 
p. 20. 
The Smith case followed the earlier case of Jensen 
v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 where the Cali-
fornia case of Whitmore v. French was approved and 
the following holding quoted: 
"Where however the driver receives a tangi-
ble benefit, monetary or otherwise which is a 
motivating influence for furnishing the transpor-
tation the driver is liable for ordinary negligence." 
(p. 344) 
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The holdings of this Court are consistent with what 
seems to be the modern trend and the great majority of 
cases on the question of guest or passenger classification. 
All the Courts seem to hold that the intention of the 
driver in undertaking the transportation is a prime con-
sideration. The teacher intends to obtain a benefit by 
getting the student to school and this benefit is the real 
motive for the invitation to ride. 
It is respectfully submitted such relationship would 
present a question of fact for the Jury to determine and 
the Trial Court's ruling is therefore correct. See Smith 
v. Franklin, Supra; Jensen v. Mower, Supra; Shapiro 
v. Bookspan, 155 Cal. App. 2d 353, 318 P.2d 123; Parrish 
v. Ash, 32 Wash. 2d 637, 203 P.2d 330; Nyberg v. Kirby, 
65 Nev. 42, 188 P.2d 1006, 193 P.2d 850; Cook v. Fariah, 
73 Nev. 295, 318 P.2d 649. 
The case of Follansbee v. Bengenberg, 122 Cal. App. 
2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 is quoted frequently for the state-
ment that: 
"A return which may make it worth the others 
while to furnish a ride." 
See also: Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal. 2d 359, 317 P.2d 
GOl, and Spring v. Liles, ________ Ore. --------, 387 P.2d 578, 
and Thuente v. Hart Motors, 234 Iowa 1294, 15 N.W. 2d 
622. 
It is respectfully submitted that the relationship of 
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teacher and student in the same school might be found 
by the Jury to be the motivating factor in the drivers 
furnishing a ride to the minor child. 
POINT II 
A MINOR CHILD OF THE AGE OF 7 YEARS CANNOT 
BE HELD TO BE A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It has been held that a child of tender age lacks the 
capacity to accept an invitation to ride. His capacity to 
understand is recognized to be limited. 
The Statutes of the State of Utah provide that a 
child under the age of '7 years is incapable of committing 
crimes. That a child between the ages of 7 years and 14 
years is incapable of committing a crime in the absence 
of clear proof that at the time of committing the act 
charged against it, it knew its wrongfulness. U.C.A. 76-
1-41. 
The Guest Statute states: 
"who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle." 
Sec. 41-9-1 U.C.A.. 1953. 
This language makes a question of fact as to whether 
or not this minor child had the capacity to accept the ride. 
The Utah Legislature did not intend minors to be respon-
sible for their acts between the ages of 7 and 14 in the 
absence of a clear proof that the minor understood the 
nature of the undertaking engaged in. 
7 
Defendant places great emphasis on the language 
of the statute which states that a guest minor may not 
recover. It is this plaintiff's position that the basic ques-
tion is whether or not the minor is a guest. Where the 
relationship of host and guest is a consentual relation-
ship, did the child consent? 
The basic question of fact is whether or not this child 
could understand the nature of the guest-host relation-
ship and whether or not she possessed the necessary 
ability to accept a ride. 
This matter has been considered by a number of 
our neighboring states where the language requires, as 
does Utah Statute, that the guest accept the ride. The 
decisions are contrary to the position taken by defendant 
Carter. The earliest and leading case on the position 
of a minor child being carried without compensation from 
the child and probably the leading case concerning this 
subject is Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 
478. In this case a police officer was hauling a 5 year 
old child who had been injured in an accident to the 
hospital when the collision and injury to the child oc-
curred. The California Supreme Court stated as follows 
concerning the law and its concept of the child's position: 
"(3) Section 141 3/4 supra, reads: 'Any per-
son who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, 
moving upon any of the public highways of the 
State of California,' etc., shall not recover for any 
injury. This section calls for some specific and 
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voluntary action on the part of a person who be-
comes an occupant of the vehicle moving upon 
the public highways of the state involved in the 
accident, resulting in an injury to such occupant. 
To be a guest one must have accepted the ride 
in the vehicle involved. We think this imports both 
a knowing and a voluntary acceptance, and does 
not include either involuntary or a forced ride. 
The word "accept" has a definite meaning. 
In 1 C.J. p. 377, it is thus defined: ''To admit and 
agree to; to accede to, or consent to; to receive 
with approval; to adopt; to agree to. In the past 
tense the word is commonly used to signify assent 
and agreement.' The meaning of the word ''agree-
ment" is thus set forth in 2 C.J. p. 979: 'In its 
broad and comprehensive sense, demonstrated by 
general usage, a coming or knitting together of 
minds ; a coming together in opinion or determi-
nation; the coming together in accord, of two 
minds, on a given proposition.* * * In law, a con-
cord of understanding and intention, between two 
or more parties, with respect to the effect upon 
their relative rights and duties, of certain past 
or future facts or performances ; the consent of 
two or more persons concurring respecting the 
transmission of some property, right or benefits, 
with the view of contracting an obligation, a mu-
tual obligation,' etc." P. 482 
The case of Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 
P.2d 262, 16 A.L.R. 2d 1297 which have been annotated 
at the cited A.L.R. volume is the case of a 5 year old 
child being taken to the doctor by her mother in an 
automobile being driven by an uncle. The accident oc-
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curred and the child was injured. The Oregon Supreme 
Court following the Rocha v. Hulen case and other cases 
to a like affect heldAhat the minor child could not be 
a guest under these circumstances as a matter of law. 
The Court reserved the question as to whether a child 
of tender years could not under any circumstances be a 
guest. The case stands for the proposition however that 
the consent of the person transported to enter into the 
relationship is necessary for a host-guest relationship to 
exist. 
In the case of Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 
N.E. 2d 670, a 6 year old child was left in the custody 
of the defendant who took it for a ride without the 
knowledge or consent of the child's parents and it was 
ruled as a matter of law again that the child was not a 
guest and that children under 7 years of age are con-
clusively presumed not to be able to consent and when 
they are under this age as a matter of law they are not 
guests and the question should not be left to the Jury. 
Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 is the 
earliest case plaintiff has discovered which discusses the 
basic problem for this Court. This involved a 12 year old 
child who was accompanying her mother, the nurse-com-
panion of the driver of the automobile. The nurse-com-
panion accompanied the driver for the driver's conven-
ience. The child was in the automobile because her mother 
had no place to leave her. 
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The Washington Court viewed the matter in the 
same general light as did the California Court and the 
Oregon Court in the other cases cited and indicated that 
a minor child under such circumstances has no real vol-
untary action. It accompanies the police officer to the 
hospital without its consent. It accompanies its mother 
to the doctor without being consulted and it accompanies 
its mother on a trip without being asked. In the present 
case, a child under Utah Law could not refuse to go to 
school nor is it consulted about the way transportation 
is arranged for it to that school. Certainly it has no 
volition in the matter of obtaining transportation. 
The latest case plaintiff has discovered which dis-
cusses this matter is the case of Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 
512, 319 P.2d 1083. A 2 year old child was involved. 
The Colorado Court citing the criminal statutes of Colo-
rado which are analogous to the Utah statutes cited in 
this point held that a 2 year old child was incapable of 
giving consent to the relationship of host and guest and 
could not as a matter of law accept the ride. In this case 
a babysitter took the child in her custody out in her car 
and the child fell out of the car and was run over by one 
of the wheels of the car. 
One case cited by the defendant in her Brief is wor-
thy of comment and that is the case of In re: TV rights 
Esfote, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911. In this case Justice 
Wertz authored the majority opinion as required by the 
Court and then dissented from his own opinion writing 
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a much more humane and common sense opinion in dis-
sent than his majority opinion. 
Many of the cases cited do involve both the social 
relationship as well as affording some other consider-
ation. Many of the cases are similar to the Smith v. 
Franklin case supra where there was a social relation-
ship and also other incentives and it is respectfully sub-
mitted that under such facts the Utah decision in Smith 
v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P. 2d 541 that a jury 
question is presented is the only reasonable and lawful 
disposition. 
In the light of the authorities cited and the Smith v. 
Franklin, supra decision, it is respectfully submitted 
that a question of fact to be determined by the Jury was 
presented by the pre-trial discussion, the Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal and the facts in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
affirm the judgment of the lower Court and order this 
matter on for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ------------ day 
of March, 1965. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
